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Paradoxes of the Regulatory State
Cass R. Sunsteint
By "paradoxes of the regulatory state," I mean self-defeating
regulatory strategies-strategies that achieve an end precisely op-
posite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justifi-
cation that can be brought forward in their support.' This defini-
tion excludes, and I will not discuss, a number of pathologies of the
regulatory state that are clearly related to the phenomenon of reg-
ulatory paradoxes, such as strategies whose costs exceed their ben-
efits, or that have unintended adverse consequences. An example
of a regulatory paradox would be a Clean Air Act that actually
made the air dirtier,2 or a civil rights law that increased the inci-
dence of racial discrimination.'
A large literature, inspired by public choice theory and welfare
economics, has grown up around the theory that purportedly pub-
lic-interested regulation is almost always an effort to create a cartel
or to serve some private interest at the public expense.4 Although I
shall be drawing on much of that literature here, I do not conclude,
f Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Politi-
cal Science, University of Chicago. Some of the arguments in this essay expand on Cass R.
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State ch 3 (Harvard,
forthcoming 1990). I am grateful to Frank Easterbrook, Jon Elster, Larry Kramer, Geoffrey
Miller, Sam Peltzman, Richard Posner, Frederick Schauer, George Stigler, David Strauss,
and Alan Sykes for helpful suggestions. For financial support, I am grateful to the James H.
Douglas, Jr. Fund for the Study of Law and Government, the Pritzker Family Faculty Fund,
and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund.
I For a more precise discussion, see Section II.
2 The current Clean Air Act does reflect this paradox in some contexts, though its over-
all effect is beneficial. See text at notes 10-12 (regulatory successes) and 40-42 (shortcomings
of Clean Air Act).
3 For an argument that the civil rights laws have sometimes had this effect, see gener-
ally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U Chi L Rev
1311 (1989); and Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U Pa
L Rev 513, 520 (1987). There is, however, a good deal of evidence that on balance, these laws
have reduced discrimination. See James S. Heckman and Brook S. Payner, Determining the
Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of
South Carolina, 79 Am Econ Rev 138 (1989); Richard B. Freeman, Black Economic Pro-
gress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in Sherwin Rosen, ed, Studies in Labor Mar-
kets 247 (U Chicago, 1981); and John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the
Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U Chi L Rev 1337 (1989).
4 See George J. Stigler, ed, Chicago Studies in Political Economy (U Chicago, 1988);
Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575, 591-97 (1982).
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as some of that literature appears to, that the appropriate response
to regulatory paradoxes is to abandon regulation altogether and
rest content with the operation of private markets. In many cases
the market itself produces harmful or even disastrous results, mea-
sured in terms of efficiency or justice.5 The appropriate response to
the paradoxes of regulation is not to return to a system of "laissez
faire,"'6 but to learn from past failures. To this end, I outline the
lessons, for legislators, judges, and administrators, that are to be
drawn from the omnipresence of regulatory paradoxes. My most
general goal is to describe some reforms by which we might
restructure regulatory institutions so as to achieve their often
salutory purposes, while at the same time incorporating the flexi-
bility, respect for individual autonomy and initiative, and produc-
tive potential of economic markets.
I. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REGULATORY STATE: A PREFATORY
NOTE
In even the most prominent evaluations of the performance of
the regulatory state, explorations of the real world consequences of
regulatory intervention are strikingly infrequent. Work in adminis-
trative law, throughout the long history of that subject, has been
conspicuously silent on the question.7 That silence is unfortunate,
for evaluation of regulatory controls and legal doctrines must de-
pend in large part on their effects in the world. The purpose of the
' Much of the relevant literature focuses on the evils of "rent-seeking"-the expendi-
ture of resources on the transfer of wealth through law rather than on the production of
wealth through markets. Insofar as this is a normative critique, it is an ideological one, and
a peculiar one at that. All laws have redistributive functions, and some such laws have pow-
erful arguments in their support. Consider measures preventing environmental degradation
or race and sex discrimination. Moreover, the expenditure of resources on laws is part and
parcel of the practice of citizenship, and it would be wrong to devalue that practice because
of the admittedly frequent phenomenon of self-interested political behavior on behalf of
causes lacking public-regarding justifications.
I The term is of course misleading insofar as it suggests an absence of governmental
controls. Even a system of laissez faire is pervaded by legal duties and disabilities that arise
from contract, tort, and property law.
7 Thus the classic discussions of the subject deal hardly at all with regulatory perform-
ance. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Little, Brown, 1965);
and Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (K.C. Davis Co., 2d ed 1978). The
problem continues with more recent work. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1669 (1975); and James 0. Freedman, Crisis
and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government (Cambridge,
1978). For essays reflecting more concern with empirical matters, see Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Progressive Law and Economics And the New Administrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341 (1988);
Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan L Rev
1333 (1985); and John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U Pa L Rev 1411 (1986).
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) is to alter the conduct of private actors in
certain ways. Evaluations that refer to "checks and balances" or
"legitimacy," 8 or that deal in general or speculative terms with the
effects of bureaucratic incentives or well-organized private groups,
are of limited use if unaccompanied by a solid understanding of
the actual consequences of regulatory programs. Attention to those
consequences, and their implications for legislative and adminis-
trative policy, is perhaps the principal task for administrative law
in the next generation.
Unfortunately, empirical assessments of the consequences of
regulation remain in a primitive state; but it is possible to draw
several general conclusions. I outline some of them here.9 Though
fashionable in many circles, the view that regulation has generally
proved unsuccessful is far too crude. For example, efforts to reduce
air pollution have in many respects been quite successful. 10 Regu-
latory controls have helped to produce substantial decreases in
both the levels and emissions of major pollutants, including sulfur
dioxide, carbon monoxide, lead, and nitrogen dioxide. Ambient
concentrations of lead have decreased especially dramatically, de-
clining eighty-five percent between 1975 and 1988; transportation
emissions of lead decreased from 122.6 million metric tons in 1975
to 3.5 in 1986.11 Most important, the vast majority of counties in
the United States are now in compliance with air quality goals. 2
Water pollution control has shown significant successes as
well. The Great Lakes are substantially cleaner than they were in
1965. A number of harmful nutrients have been reduced by nearly
fifty percent in national rivers. Governmentally-required lead and
nitrate reductions have produced significant improvements in
' See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy at 260-62 (cited in note 7); Stewart, 88 Harv L
Rev at 1670-71 (cited in note 7).
1 Two disclaimers are necessary. First, the methodological problems are severe, partly
because of the difficulty of valuing costs and (especially) benefits, and partly because of the
difficulty of holding everything else constant in measuring regulatory effects. For this reason
the numbers and assessments in the text are contestable. Second, any evaluation must have
a significant normative dimension; it cannot depend on the facts alone. For more details, see
Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State ch 3
(Harvard, forthcoming 1990).
10 See The Conservation Foundation, State of the Environment: A View Toward the
Nineties (1987); and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Environmental Quality:
The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality
together with The President's Message to Congress (GPO, 1987-88).
x Conservation Foundation, State of the Environment at 152-53 (cited in note 10).
12 CEQ, Environmental Quality at 49 (cited in note 10).
1990]
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water quality.' 3 All in all, both air and water are substantially
cleaner than they would have been without regulatory controls,
and despite a wide range of errors, the American experience serves
in some respects as a model for the rest of the world.
Similarly, automobile safety regulation has significantly re-
duced deaths and serious injuries.' 4 Automobiles are much safer
for occupants. For example, highway fatalities would have been
about forty percent higher in 1981 if not for governmental con-
trols.'5 Between 1966 and 1974, the lives of about 34,000 passenger
car occupants were saved as a result of occupant safety stan-
dards.'6 The annual benefits from regulation exceed ten billion dol-
lars.'" Moreover, for automobile regulation the ratio of benefits to
costs is extremely high. Indeed, some of the regulations pay for
themselves in terms of health and related savings, and the large
number of deaths actually prevented is of course a bonus. 8
More generally, studies of the costs and benefits of regulatory
initiatives show that a number of other measures have produced
health and other benefits at especially low costs. OSHA's regula-
tion of asbestos prevents an estimated 396 deaths per year, and it
does so at relatively low expense.' EPA's regulation of
trihalomethanes saves a life at only $300,000 per year; the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) fuel system in-
tegrity controls, also $300,000; the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission's (CPSC) mandatory smoke detector rule, between $0 and
$85,000; NHTSA's roadside hazard removal rule, $0.20
Finally, regulatory successes are not limited to the areas of
safety and health. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has led to a de-
" See CEQ, Environmental Quality (cited in note 10).
" See Robert W. Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile 44-74 (Brookings Institu-
tion, 1986).
" Id at 75.
Id at 57.
Id at 77.
18 John U. Graham and James W. Vaupel, Value of a Life: What Difference Does It
Make?, 1 Risk Analysis 89.90 (1981); John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance
Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA: April 1, 1986-March
31, 1987 23-26 (MIT, 1988); Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government xxi (GPO, 1987); Ivy E.
Broder and John F. Morrall III, The Economic Basis for OSHA's and EPA's Generic Car-
cinogen Regulations, in Richard J. Zeckhauser and Derek Leebaert, eds, What Role for
Government? Lessons from Policy Research 242, 247-48 (Duke, 1983); John F. Morrall, III,
A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 25, 29-52 (November/December 1986).
19 See Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 64, 248 (cited in note
18).
20 See Morrall, 10 Regulation at 30 (cited in note 18); Graham and Vaupel, 1 Risk Anal-
[57:407
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crease in racial discrimination in employment.2 There have been
gains in the area of sex discrimination as well.2 2 And the Endan-
gered Species Act has saved a number of species from extinction
and endangerment.23
On the other hand, regulation has frequently failed. Some-
times it has imposed enormously high costs for speculative bene-
fits; sometimes it has accomplished little or nothing; and some-
times it has aggravated the very problem it was designed to solve.
For example, the United States spent no less than $632 billion for
pollution control between 1972 and 1985, and some studies suggest
that alternative strategies could have achieved the same gains at
less than one-fifth the cost.24 The fuel economy standards for new
cars appear to have produced no substantial independent gains in
fuel economy, given consumer demands for fuel efficient cars in re-
sponse to gas shortages and high gas prices. 5 Worse, they have led
manufacturers to produce smaller, more dangerous cars; an esti-
mated 2,200-3,900 mortalities are expected over the next ten years
as a result of regulatory changes in 1989 alone.26 There is little
question that the administration of the Natural Gas Act helped
produce the energy crisis of the late 1970s-with huge attendant
costs to investment and employment-by artificially restraining
the price of gas.2 Some of OSHA's carcinogen regulations impose
enormous costs for uncertain gains. Indeed, the pattern of OSHA
regulation of carcinogens is a crazy quilt; regulations costing up to
$40 million per life saved exist in some areas, with no regulations
at all in others.2 8 The EPA has promulgated only seven regulations
controlling toxic substances, so that a huge number of such sub-
ysis at 91-93 (cited in note 18). These studies also show a bizarre pattern of controls, with
some programs saving lives at exceptionally high costs. Thus the FDA ban on DES in cat-
tlefeed saves a life at $132 million each year, while much regulation of automobiles costs
$400,000 or less per life.
21 See text at notes 70-71; and John J. Donohue III and James J. Heckman, Continuous
Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Affirmative Action and Civil Rights Policy on the
Economic Status of Blacks, J Econ Perspectives (forthcoming, 1990).
22 See Donohue, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1360-62 (cited in note 3).
21 See Steven Lewis Yaffee, Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal Endangered
Species Act (MIT, 1982).
24 Thomas H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Pol-
icy 41-45 (Resources for the Future, 1985).
22 See Crandall, Regulating the Automobile at 157-58 (cited in note 14).
26 Robert W. Crandall and John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on
Automobile Safety, 32 J L & Econ 97, 115 (1989).
21 See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 244 (Harvard, 1982).
28 See Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 22 (cited in note 18).
1990]
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stances remain uncontrolled.29 By delaying the entry of beneficial
drugs into the market, the Food and Drug Administration has, in
many settings, dramatically increased risks to life and health. °
The general task of regulatory reform raises issues far beyond
the scope of this discussion. Ironically, a large source of regulatory
failure in the United States is the use of Soviet-style command and
control regulation, which dictates, at the national level, technolo-
gies and control strategies for hundreds, thousands, or millions of
companies and individuals in a nation that is exceptionally diverse
in terms of geography, costs and benefits of regulatory controls,
attitudes, and mores.31 A valuable perspective on this problem can
be obtained by examining the paradoxes of regulation, which pose
a particular dilemma for the administrative state. A government
that eliminated self-defeating regulatory strategies would eliminate
a significant source of regulatory failure. And although the para-
doxes are numerous, six of them have been of major importance in
the last generation.
II. THE PARADOXES
I have defined a regulatory paradox as a self-defeating regula-
tory strategy; but whether a strategy is self-defeating depends on
how its purposes are described. Any statute that fails to produce a
net benefit to society can be described as self-defeating if its pur-
pose is described as the improvement of the world. But if the stat-
ute's purpose is to benefit a particular group or segment of society,
and that purpose is achieved, then the statute is not self-defeating
at all. For example, a statute benefiting the agricultural industry at
the expense of the public will not be self-defeating if its purpose is
described as helping farmers. Throughout this discussion I de-
scribe the relevant statutory purposes at an intermediate level of
generality and as public-regarding rather than as benefitting spe-
cial interest groups. Under this approach, a statute whose costs
outweigh its benefits, or that produces irrationality of various
sorts, is not necessarily paradoxical.
29 See Note, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Section
112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 NYU L Rev 612, 613-14 (1988).
11 See Henry G. Grabowski and John M Vernon, The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals
10-13, 46-47 (American Enterprise Institute, 1983).
31 See generally Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (cited in note 27); Richard B. Stew-
art, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation,
1985 Wis L Rev 655, 680-82; and Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution ch 3 (cited in note
9).
[57:407
HeinOnline  -- 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.  412 1990
Regulatory Paradoxes
Moreover, I mean to assess whether a statute is self-defeating
by comparing the result it has produced to the likely state of af-
fairs had Congress enacted a different and better statute or no
statute at all.32 Measured against these benchmarks, regulation has
produced a wide range of paradoxes.
Importantly, nearly all of the paradoxes are a product of the
government's failure to understand how the relevant ac-
tors-administrators and regulated entities-will adapt to regula-
tory programs. The world simply cannot be held constant after
regulations have been issued. Strategic responses, the creation of
perverse incentives for administrators and regulated entities, unan-
ticipated changes in product mix and private choice-these are the
hallmarks of the paradoxes of the regulatory state. The adoption of
strategies that take account of these phenomena would produce
enormous savings in both compliance costs and safety and health
gains. In this sense, a response to the regulatory paradoxes would
produce no losers, or at least no losers who have a legitimate basis
for complaint.
A. Paradox 1: Overregulation Produces Underregulation
The first paradox is that especially aggressive statutory con-
trols frequently produce too little regulation of the private market.
This surprising outcome arises when Congress mandates overly
stringent controls, so that administrators will not issue regulations
at all, or will refuse to enforce whatever regulations they or Con-
gress have issued.3
The imposition of extremely stringent controls on regulated
industries is a common strategy in Congress. Such controls typi-
cally ban cost-benefit balancing or indeed trade-offs of any sort. 4
The expectation is that these controls will bring about safety in
the workplace, or clean air and water, even if both the agency and
industry are reluctant to act, and even if the costs of regulation are
high. This strategy was especially popular during the dramatic
growth of regulation in the 1960s and 1970s. It both fueled and was
fueled by the notion that a safe workplace, or clean air and water,
32 Additional benchmarks include the intended effects of the regulation and the status
quo ante. Of course the "alternative statute" and "no statute" benchmarks point in differ-
ent directions; the context should make those differences clear.
3 This is similar to a more general phenomenon in the criminal law: severe or
mandatory sentences can actually produce less deterrence, because they make prosecutors
reluctant to bring charges and juries reluctant to convict.
31 See Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§ 7409(b)(1), 7412(a)(1) (1982); Clean Water Act, 33
USC § 1316(a)(1) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC § 655(b)(5) (1982).
1990]
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should be treated as involving a right to be vindicated rather than
a risk to be managed. Consider President Nixon's proclamation:
"Clean air, clean water, open spaces-these should again be the
birthright for every American."35 This form of rights-based think-
ing was also inspired by evidence that recalcitrant agencies, suffer-
ing from inertia or immobilized by the power of well-organized pri-
vate groups, frequently disregarded regulatory controls. 6
The strategy of imposing stringent regulatory controls or ban-
ning cost-benefit balancing is not hard to understand. It is only
natural to think that if air pollution is a severe problem, the cor-
rect response is to reduce it as much as possible; and this idea
quickly translates into a command to the EPA to reduce dangerous
substances in the atmosphere to a level that will not adversely af-
fect human health. 1 Similarly, an obvious method for controlling
toxic substances in the workplace is to tell OSHA to eliminate
these substances "to the extent feasible."38 Such strategies might
produce too much regulation, but this might be thought a small
price to pay for (finally) reducing pollution in the air or deaths in
the workplace.3 9 In addition, a prohibition on "balancing" might be
thought desirable by those fearful that any effort to balance would
be distorted by the enforcement agency's undervaluation of life
and health, especially in the context of seemingly permanent polit-
ical divisions between the executive and the legislature.
But consider the record of both the EPA and OSHA in these
settings. Of the several hundred toxic substances plausibly posing
significant risks to human health, the EPA has regulated only
seven-five as a result of court orders. 40 Of the many toxic sub-
stances in the workplace, OSHA has controlled only ten. Stun-
ningly, this is so even though the private organization that once
performed some of OSHA's functions has recommended lower ex-
posure limits for hundreds of chemicals.4 To be sure, those sub-
stances that EPA and OSHA regulate are stringently controlled.42
" State of the Union Address, 8 Public Papers of President Richard M. Nixon 13
(GPO, 1970). See also statutes cited in note 34.
" See Kay Lehman Scholzman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and Ameri-
can Democracy 63-87 (Harper & Row, 1986).
3 Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7409(b)(1).
3' Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC § 655(b)(5).
' Of course any-gain in this tradeoff depends on the magnitude of the relevant
consequences.
"' See Note, 63 NYU L Rev at 613-14; 626 (cited in note 29).
1 See Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 2, 82 (cited in note
18).
42 Id at 73-102.
[57:407
HeinOnline  -- 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.  414 1990
Regulatory Paradoxes
The current pattern, however, includes not only substantial over-
regulation of the substances that are subject to federal standards,
but also, and possibly more serious, substantial underregulation of
dangerous substances, such as chromium, perchloroethylene, and
trichloroethylene.43
Despite the stringency of statutory standards, many activities
in the United States are entirely free from regulatory controls.
There is no evidence that the United States generally does a better
job than England in protecting workers and citizens from occupa-
tional and environmental hazards, even though the English system
consciously allows balancing in most contexts and the American
system consciously rejects it.44
Statutes containing stringent regulatory requirements have
thus yielded no protection at all in many settings. What is respon-
sible for this astonishing outcome? One is tempted to find answers
in the power of regulated industries or in the intransigence and
deregulatory zeal of government officials. But the pattern of under-
regulation can be found in the Carter Administration as well as the
Reagan Administration, even though President Carter's appoin-
tees, drawn in large number from the consumer and environmental
movements, were hardly eager to prevent the government from
curbing the proliferation of toxic substances. Elaborate and costly
procedural requirements for the promulgation of federal regula-
tions undoubtedly provide some explanation, since the process, in-
cluding judicial review, has built into it enormous delays and per-
verse incentives.4 5 These requirements surely slow down and deter
rulemaking. Industry has every opportunity and every incentive to
fend off regulation by making plausible claims that additional in-
formation is necessary before regulation can be undertaken. This
explanation is not in itself adequate, however, because organized
interests have not prevented agencies from being far more aggres-
sive in other settings.
"3 Id at 74-102.
" See David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great
Britain and the United States 163 (Cornell, 1986).
45 See Stewart, 1985 Wis L Rev 655 (cited in note 31); and Mendeloff, The Dilemma of
Toxic Substance Regulation at 115-24 (cited in note 18).
For an intriguing solution to this problem, see the discussion of California's Proposition
65 in David Roe, An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls, 3 Econ
Dev Q 179 (1979). Proposition 65 requires businesses to warn people exposed to any one of a
list of specified chemicals, unless there has been a governmental finding that the chemical in
question poses no significant risk. By putting the burden of inertia on regulated industry,
Proposition 65 creates incentives rather than disincentives for the issuance of regulations
distinguishing safe from unsafe levels.
1990]
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A large part of the explanation lies in the stringency of the
regulatory standard itself. A stringent standard-one that forbids
balancing or calls for regulation to or beyond the point of "feasibil-
ity"-makes regulators reluctant to act.46 If, as is customary, regu-
lators have discretion not to promulgate regulations at all, a strin-
gent standard will provide them with a powerful incentive for
inaction. Their inaction is not caused by venality or confusion. In-
stead, it reflects their quite plausible belief that the statute often
requires them to regulate to an absurd point. If regulators were to
issue controls under the statute, government and private resources
would be unavailable to control other toxic substances; domestic
industry costs would increase; and ultimately industries competing
in world markets would face a serious risk of shutdown. Under
these circumstances, a stringent standard will mobilize political op-
position to regulation from within and without government. It will
also increase the likelihood of judicial invalidation. Finally, it will
require agencies to obtain greater supporting information to sur-
vive political and judicial scrutiny, while at the same time making
it less likely that such information will be forthcoming from regu-
lated class members. All the incentives are therefore in the direc-
tion of issuing fewer regulations.
It is thus unsurprising that a draconian standard produces un-
derregulation as well as overregulation. A crazy quilt pattern of se-
vere controls in some areas and none in others is the predictable
consequence of a statute that forbids balancing and tradeoffs.
The problem goes deeper still. Even if the resistance of the
agency has been overcome, and some or many regulations have
been issued under a statute calling for stringent regulatory con-
trols, the risk of underregulation does not disappear. Levels of en-
forcement-inspections and fines-will reflect the agency's reluc-
tance.47 This has in fact been the pattern with OSHA's safety and
health regulations, some of which have been effectively unen-
forced4 s by Democratic as well as Republican administrations.
This, then, is the first paradox of the regulatory state: stringent
regulatory standards produce underregulation.49
"' See Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation at 11-12 (cited in note
18).
47 Low appropriations are also a predictable consequence.
48 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
22-24 (Harvard, 1983).
" At least in theory, it is possible that this effect will not occur-if the agency has no
enforcement discretion, or if it is determined (for example) to eliminate all risk-creating
substances from the atmosphere. But the absence of enforcement discretion is rare, and an
[57:407
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B. Paradox 2: Stringent Regulation of New Risks Can Increase
Aggregate Risk Levels
Frequently Congress is presented with a risk or problem that
can be found both in existing entities and in potential entrants.
For example, automobiles produce carbon monoxide; modern elec-
tricity plants emit sulfur dioxide; many existing buildings are inac-
cessible to the handicapped; and drugs currently on the market
pose health hazards to consumers. In such situations, a common
strategy has been to impose especially severe limitations on new
sources but to exempt old ones. Indeed, such exemptions might be
a political prerequisite for enactment of the regulation. Congress
might require that new automobiles be equipped with pollution
control devices, that new plants emitting pollution meet stringent
regulatory controls, that new buildings be accessible to the handi-
capped, and that new drugs survive special safety requirements.
This strategy is a pervasive one in current regulatory law, and
it has obvious advantages.5 0 Retroactive application of regulatory
requirements can be extremely costly; the expense of altering ex-
isting practices is often high. Requiring the specified approach only
prospectively can achieve significant savings. In addition, it may be
unfair to impose costs on people who would have ordered their af-
fairs quite differently had they been informed beforehand of the
regulatory regime.5
As a control technique, however, the strategy of imposing costs
exclusively on new sources or entrants can be self-defeating. Most
important, it will discourage the addition of new sources and en-
courage the perpetuation of old ones. The problem is not merely
that old risks will continue, but that, precisely because of regula-
tory programs, those risks will become more common and last
longer than they otherwise would.
Two different phenomena underlie the old risk-new risk para-
dox. First, those who plan regulatory programs often assume that
the programs will not influence private choices. Private choices are,
however, a function of current supply and demand. If the program
agency determined to eliminate all risks will create paradoxes of its own-causing ancillary
social harms, or producing greater risks of different sorts. Compare the Delaney Clause,
discussed in the text at notes 59-60.
50 See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 Va L Rev 1025
(1983).
1X A recurring problem with regulatory schemes, and with this one in particular, is that
the imposition of requirements on new sources imposes large opportunity costs, which are
real and sometimes large but usually imperceptible.
1990]
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raises the price of new products it will shift choices in the direction
of old risks. Second, a focus on new risks reduces the entry of po-
tentially superior sources or technologies and thus perpetuates old
ones. Regulatory controls eliminate possibilities that might have
turned out to be substantially safer than currently available op-
tions. The result is to increase the life of those options.
Examples are not difficult to find. The EPA's program requir-
ing the installation of anti-pollution technology in new automobiles
belongs in the first category.52 This program has prolonged the use
of old, dirty vehicles, retarding the ordinary, salutary retirement of
major sources of environmental degradation. 3 Command and con-
trol regulation of new pollution sources creates incentives to use
existing facilities longer, with harmful consequences for the envi-
ronment.6 4 Prescription requirements probably discourage people
from purchasing beneficial drugs and to that extent impair
health.5 5 Imposition of high, safety-related costs on new airplanes
may well encourage airlines to retain (and repair) old, risky planes.
One might put the EPA's requirement of costly "scrubbing"
strategies for new sources of sulfur dioxide in the second category.
This rule has perpetuated the existence of old sources of sulfur di-
oxide, thus aggravating in many parts of the country the very
problem it was designed to solve. 6 So too, the imposition of strin-
gent barriers to nuclear power plants has perpetuated the risks
produced by coal, a significantly more dangerous power source."
And perhaps worst of all, the FDA's stringent regulatory standards
for approving new drugs have forced consumers to resort to old
drugs, which are frequently more dangerous or less beneficial than
the new drugs being kept off the market.58
A final example of the old risk/new risk paradox is the Dela-
ney Clause,59 which prohibits manufacturers from using food addi-
52 See Bruce Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 27 (Yale, 1981).
53 See Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile at 89-90 (cited in note 14).
" Michael T. Maloney and Gordon L. Brady, Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollu-
tion Rights, 31 J L & Econ 203, 214-26, 224 (1988) (finding a twenty-seven percent increase
in sulfur dioxide emissions as a result of capital turnover deterrence in certain states). Com-
pare W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety Regula-
tion, 28 J L & Econ 527, 552 (1985).
" Sam Peltzman, The Health Effects of Mandatory Prescriptions, 30 J L & Econ 207,
234-36 (1987).
56 See Ackerman & Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air at 2, 11-12 (cited in note 52).
See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear Energy
Controversy, 91 Harv L Rev 1833, 1835-90 (1978).
" See Huber, 69 Va L Rev at 1075 (cited in note 50).
21 USC § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
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tives containing carcinogens. Ironically, this provision has probably
increased safety and health risks. The Clause forces manufacturers
to use noncarcinogenic, but sometimes more dangerous, sub-
stances. In addition, it makes consumers resort to substances al-
ready on the market that often pose greater risks than new en-
trants would. Since the newest and best detection equipment is
used on proposed new additives, the statutorily prohibited additive
may well pose fewer risks to consumers than substances already on
the market that were tested with cruder technology. Thus the De-
laney Clause defeats its own purpose.6 °
The phenomenon of careful regulation of new risks and lenient
or no regulation of old ones may not simply reflect legislative myo-
pia or confusion. Public choice theory provides a plausible expla-
nation for the phenomenon. A system of regulation that imposes
controls solely on new products or facilities should have considera-
ble appeal for those in possession of old ones. If new sources will
face regulatory costs, the system of government controls will im-
munize existing producers from fresh competition. Indeed, the reg-
ulatory statute will create a partial cartel, establishing a common
interest among current producers and giving them a significant
competitive advantage over potential new entrants. The victims of
the old-new division, however, often do not yet exist. They are usu-
ally hard to identify, do not perceive themselves as victims, and
are not politically organized.
It may be for this reason that the careful regulation of new
risks is such a popular strategy. It is apt to be favored both by
existing industry and by many of those who seek to impose con-
trols in the first instance. The potential victims-consumers and
new entrants-often have insufficient political strength to counter
the proposals. When this phenomenon is combined with the appar-
ently sensible but sometimes self-defeating idea that a phase-in
strategy is better than one that requires conversions of existing
producers, it is no surprise that the old risk-new risk division re-
mains so popular.
s' See Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation
of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 Yale J Reg 1
(1988). See also Peter W. Huber, Liability (Basic Books, 1988).
A qualification is necessary here. It is possible that people are especially fearful of can-
cer and not so fearful of other, equally dangerous health risks, and that this configuration of
fears underlay the Delaney Clause. In that case, the Clause would serve its specific purpose
of keeping carcinogens off the market, irrespective of the relative health risks of various
products. Although the Clause might in fact increase overall health risks, it would not be a
regulatory paradox, since it successfully implements its primary goal.
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C. Paradox 3: To Require the Best Available Technology is to
Retard Technological Development
Industry frequently fails to adopt the best technology for con-
trolling environmental or other harms. The technology exists or
can be developed relatively cheaply, but polluters simply refuse to
use it. Congress and the EPA have often responded by requiring
that all industries use the best available technology (BAT). The
BAT strategy is pervasive in federal environmental law,6 and may
indeed be its most distinctive characteristic.
The BAT strategy is motivated by a desire to produce techno-
logical innovation, and here it has a surface plausibility. As dis-
cussed above, recent years have witnessed large decreases in air
and water pollution, and these decreases are partly attributable to
the use of emission control technologies. Requiring the adoption of
the best available control technology seems a sensible way to en-
sure that all industries are doing their utmost to prevent pollution.
This strategy also appears inexpensive to enforce. The government
simply decides on the best technology and then requires all indus-
tries to comply.2
The BAT approach, however, can defeat its own purposes and
thus produce a regulatory paradox. It is an extremely clumsy strat-
egy for protecting the environment. To be sure, the approach is a
plausible one if the goal is to ensure that all firms use currently
established technology. But a large goal of regulation should be to
promote technological innovation in pollution control. Regulation
should increase rather than decrease incentives to innovate. Gov-
ernment is rarely in a good position to know what sorts of innova-
tions are likely to be forthcoming; industry will have a huge com-
parative advantage here. Perversely, requiring adoption of the
BAT eliminates the incentive to innovate at all, and indeed creates
disincentives for innovation by imposing an economic punishment
on innovators. Under the BAT approach, polluting industries have
no financial interest in the development of better pollution control
technology that imposes higher production costs. Indeed, the oppo-
site is true. The BAT approach encourages industry to seek any
means to delay and deter new regulation. Industry will have the
information as well as the incentive to persuade administrators,
"' See, for example, 42 USC § 7411(a)(1)(C) (Clean Air Act); 33 USC § 1316(a)(1)
(Clean Water Act).
2 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan L Rev 1267 (1985).
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courts, and other authorities that a suggested technology is not
"feasible" and should not be required.
If government requires whatever technology is available, then,
industry has no economic reason to develop new mechanisms for
decreasing safety and health risks. Moreover, the BAT approach,
applicable as it is only to new sources, raises the cost of retiring old
facilities, which delays capital turnover and in that way aggravates
environmental degradation. The paradox, in a nutshell, is this:
designed to promote good control technology, the BAT strategy ac-
tually discourages innovation. It is therefore self-defeating.
One might respond to this hypothesis by arguing that under
the BAT approach outsiders should have an incentive to innovate,
precisely because government will force industry to adopt the re-
sulting technology. But no well-functioning market in pollution
control technology exists for those outside of the regulated indus-
tries, and for good reasons. First, outsiders often lack the relevant
information, which is unusually expensive because it turns on facts
that are highly technical and known best to participants in the in-
dustry. In practice, outsiders must depend on cooperation from
regulated class members, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. The
start-up costs are therefore exceptionally high for third parties.
Second, regulation often changes dramatically over time, a phe-
nomenon that discourages a stable market in control technology.
The result is that innovations by outsiders have not come about
under BAT approaches. 4
D. Paradox 4: Redistributive Regulation Harms Those at the
Bottom of the Socioeconomic Ladder
A common justification for regulation is redistribution. The
legislature imposes controls on the market to prevent what it sees
as exploitation 65 or unfair dealing by those with a competitive ad-
vantage. In principle, the claim for redistribution is often a power-
ful one. Market wages and prices depend on a wide range of factors
that are morally irrelevant: supply and demand curves at any par-
ticular point; variations in family structure and opportunities for
63 See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 69 Cal L Rev 1256, 1285 (1981). See also Ackerman & Stewart, 37 Stan
L Rev 1333 (cited in note 7); and Maloney & Brady, 31 J L & Econ at 222 (cited in note 54).
'4 See Stewart, 69 Cal L Rev at 1283 (cited in note 63).
65 The term "exploitation" should be taken as a normative one, pointing to (for exam-
ple) insufficient wages, unduly long hours, and so forth. See Jon Elster, Making Sense of
Marx (Cambridge, 1985).
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education and employment; existing tastes; and perhaps even dif-
ferences in initial endowments, including talents, intelligence, or
physical strength.6 So long as the regulation can be made effective
and does not produce high ancillary costs (an important qualifica-
tion), government should not always take these factors as "natu-
ral," or let them be turned into social disadvantages.
Minimum wage legislation, for example, prevents workers
from having to settle for market wages that do not even approach
the poverty level and thus offer minimal incentives to work; occu-
pational safety statutes protect workers against extremely hazard-
ous workplaces; rent control legislation prevents tenants from be-
ing subject to unanticipated price increases and perhaps thrown
into significantly inferior housing;6 and implied warranties of hab-
itability protect tenants from living in disgraceful and indeed dan-
gerous apartments.
In all these cases, however, regulation is a poor mechanism for
redistributing resources, precisely because it is often self-defeat-
ing. 8 The problem is that if everything else is held constant,69 the
market will frequently adjust to the imposition of regulation in a
way that will harm the least well-off. It is a mistake to assume that
regulation will directly transfer resources or create only ex post
winners and losers-an idea exemplified by the assumption that
the only effect of the minimum wage is to raise wages for those
currently working. An important consequence of the minimum
wage is to increase unemployment by raising the price of marginal
labor; and those at the bottom of the ladder-the most vulnerable
members of society-are the victims.70 In the same vein, rent con-
trol legislation and implied warranties of habitability create incen-
tives for producers (landlords) to leave and disincentives to enter
the housing market, with perverse redistributive consequences and
6 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 311 (Harvard, 1971) ("Surely a person's moral
worth does not vary according to how many offer similar skills, or happen to want what he
can produce. No one supposes that when someone's abilities are less in demand or have
deteriorated (as in the case of singers) his moral deservingness undergoes a similar shift.");
G.A. Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain, in John Arthur and William Shaw, eds,
Justice and Economic Distribution 246 (Prentice-Hall, 1978).
67 See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 Phil & Pub Aff. 350 (1986).
68 See Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal
Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
Am Econ Rev 414 (1981); and Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Jus-
tice, 89 Yale L J 472, 475 (1980).
"I See text at notes 74-75 (noting that redistributive regulation may be more justifiable
if accompanied by other departures from the status quo).
"o See Finis Welsh, Minimum Wage: Issues and Evidence (American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1978).
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especially harsh results for the poor, who may be left without hous-
ing at all.7 '
Laws forbidding discrimination or requiring affirmative action
will to some extent have the same effect, since they will make it
more expensive to hire blacks, women, and older people by increas-
ing the likelihood that employers will be subject to a lawsuit in the
event of a discharge.7 2 Similarly, occupational safety and health
regulation does not unambiguously promote the interests of work-
ers. By raising costs, it may depress wages and increase unemploy-
ment, thus harming the least well-off.7 3 In each of these cases, the
group that is harmed is likely to be poorly organized and incapable
of expressing itself through the political process.
In sum, redistributive regulation will have complex distribu-
tive consequences, and the group particularly disadvantaged by the
regulation will typically consist of those who are already most dis-
advantaged. Efforts to redistribute resources through regulation
will therefore have a serious perverse result.
Two often overlooked qualifications are necessary here. First,
the redistributive regulation, though in some ways perverse, might
be part of a system of redistribution that is effective overall. A
minimum wage law might be justified as a means of protecting the
working poor if it is accompanied by a welfare system to take care
of those who cannot work at all. For this reason, plausible argu-
ments can be made for the minimum wage despite its self-defeat-
ing aspect. It has been argued, for example, that an increase in the
minimum wage is necessary to guarantee that work will be suffi-
ciently remunerative to keep people out of poverty and to send a
signal about the importance and value of work, thereby increasing
the supply of and demand for labor. These effects might outweigh
the unemployment effect. According to some estimates, a ten per-
cent increase in the minimum wage would increase unemployment
among young people by only one percent. 4
71 See Werner Z. Hirsch, Joel G. Hirsch, and Stephen Margolis, Regression Analysis of
the Effects of Habitability Laws upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-
Komesar Debate, 63 Cal L Rev 1098, 1139 (1975).
72 See Posner, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1326, 1331, 1333 (cited in note 3).
73 This is hardly a decisive argument against such laws. The existence of inadequate
information provides a good argument for regulatory controls here, quite apart from redis-
tribution. See Rose-Ackerman, 98 Yale L J at 355-57 (cited in note 7). Moreover, the redis-
tributive gains from the statute might justify it on balance notwithstanding its costs in
harming some people. See text at notes 103-07.
71 See David T. Ellwood, Poor Support 112 (Basic Books, 1988).
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A second qualification of the redistribution paradox relates to
the fact that preferences are not static. Preferences are usually
taken as exogenous to and independent of the legal rule, but some-
times this is a mistake.75 If the statute in question transforms pref-
erences and beliefs, the self-defeating effect just described will not
occur. For example, laws forbidding sexual harassment aim to alter
the desires and beliefs of would-be harassers; and if the laws suc-
ceed in this goal, any perverse side effects may be minimal or non-
existent. The same argument may apply to antidiscrimination laws
generally. If such laws change attitudes, they may not on balance
harm the least well-off. There is, however, little empirical evidence
on the effects of law in changing preferences and beliefs, and in
any case this is not likely to result from such redistributive regula-
tion as minimum wage legislation.
E. Paradox 5: Disclosure Requirements May Make People Less
Informed
Sometimes markets fail because people are deceived or lack
information.76  Regulatory agencies commonly respond by requir-
ing correction or full disclosure. Congress and agencies have im-
posed disclosure regulations in many areas, ranging from occupa-
tional and environmental risks to potentially deceptive
advertising.77 Here the rationale is straightforward. Whether or not
ignorance is bliss, it is an obstacle to informed consumer choice.
Surely, it might be asked, regulation cannot be condemned for in-
creasing information?
Disclosure strategies are indeed valuable i n many circum-
stances. But for two reasons, they can be self-defeating. The first is
that people sometimes process information poorly.7 8 After being
given certain data, they actually "know" less than they did before-
hand. In particular, when people receive information about
probabilities, especially low ones, they frequently rely on heuristics
7' For discussion, see Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U
Chi L Rev 1129 (1986); and Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (cited in note 9).
'0 See Peter Asch, Consumer Safety Regulation: Putting a Price on Life and Limb 48-
59 (Oxford, 1988), for a good discussion.
77 See OSHA's hazardous communications policy, 29 USC § 657 (c),(d). On deceptive
advertising, see Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 BU L Rev 657
(1985).
7" See Hal R. Arkes and Kenneth R. Hammond, Judgment and Decisionmaking: An
Interdisciplinary Reader (Cambridge, 1986); Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1-20 (Cambridge, 1982); and
Cass Sunstein, 53 U Chi L Rev at 1167-69 (cited in note 75).
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that lead to systematic errors. 9 Thus, for example, people assess
probabilities by asking if the event was a recent one and by misun-
derstanding the phenomenon of regression to the mean. 0 In addi-
tion, disclosure or corrective language can help straighten out one
form of false belief but at the same time increase the level of other
kinds of false beliefs."' Finally, there is a risk of information over-
load, causing consumers to treat a large amount of information as
equivalent to no information at all.82 All this suggests that with
respect to information, less may be more. Additional information
can breed confusion and a weaker understanding of the situation
at hand.
The second problem is that a requirement of disclosure or per-
fect accuracy will sometimes lead producers or other regulated en-
tities to furnish no information whatsoever. For example, if pro-
ducers are prohibited from advertising unless they eliminate all
potential deception or offer strong substantiation for their claims,
they might not advertise at all. The result will be the removal from
the market of information that is useful overall. 3 If advertisers
must conduct extensive tests before they are permitted to make
claims, they will be given a strong incentive to avoid making claims
at all. More generally, almost all substantive advertisements will
deceive at least some people in light of the exceptional heterogene-
ity of listeners and viewers. If this is so, efforts to eliminate decep-
tion will significantly reduce advertising with substantive content.
These various difficulties suggest that the recent enthusiasm
for disclosure requirements is in at least some settings a mistake,
for the simple reason that it defeats its own purpose. Disclosure
requirements sometimes ensure that people are less informed.
79 See Kahneman et al, Judgment Under Uncertainty 1-20 (cited in note 78).
80 -gee id at 7, 9-]6.
81 See Jacob Jacoby, Margaret C. Nelson, and Wayne D. Hoyer, Corrective Advertising
and Affirmative Disclosure Statements: Their Potential for Confusing and Misleading the
Consumer, 46 J Mktg 61, 70 (Winter 1982); Philip G. Kuehl and Robert F. Dyer, Applica-
tions of the "Normative Belief" Technique for Measuring the Effectiveness of Deceptive
and Corrective Advertisements, 4 Advances in Consumer Research 204, 209 (1976); and
Michael B. Mazis and Janice E. Atkinson, An Experimental Evaluation of A Proposed Cor-
rective Advertising Remedy, 13 J Mktg Res 178, 181-83 (1976).
82 See Craswell, 65 BU L Rev at 690-91 (cited in note 77).
83 See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation
of Consumer Information, 24 J L & Econ 491, 520 (1981); and Robert Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv L Rev 661, 682-83
(1977).
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F. Paradox 6: Independent Agencies are not Independent
The distinctive institutional legacy of the New Deal period is
the "independent" agency. An agency is independent if Congress
has provided that its members can be discharged by the President
only for specified causes. If Congress has so provided, it is
ordinarily understood that the President cannot discharge inde-
pendent commissioners simply because he disagrees with their
views, and that his supervisory authority is sharply limited. 4 Inde-
pendent agencies, some of them antedating the New Deal, include
the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the National
Labor Relations Board. The paradox at issue here is one of institu-
tional design rather than substantive regulatory policy.
The argument for the independent agency stems largely from
a belief in the need for expert, apolitical, and technically sophisti-
cated administration of the laws." Even if independent agencies
achieved this end, one might question the goal itself. Independent
agencies often must make important judgments of policy and prin-
ciple, and on those judgments expertise is never decisive. Consider,
for example, the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
defining what constitutes an unfair labor practice; the judgment of
the FCC about whether licensees are obliged to present program-
ming on public issues, or whether diversity on the basis of race or
sex counts in favor of an applicant for a license; and the safety
requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. None of
these policies is based solely on technocratic judgments, and so
may properly belong in the political rather than the regulatory
sphere.
But even if one accepts the premise that political indepen-
dence is necessary, the fact is that independent agencies are not
independent at all. Indeed, such agencies are highly responsive to
shifts in political opinion and even to the views of the President."6
But the problem is even worse than that. The independent agen-
cies have generally been highly susceptible to the political pressure
I question this understanding below. See text at notes 126-35.
85 See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (Greenwood Press, 1938). See also
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 S Ct Rev 41 (presenting but rejecting this
argument and claiming that Congress may not constitutionally deny the President the
power to remove a policymaking official who has refused a presidential order).
86 See Terry Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 Am J
Pol Sci 197 (1982).
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of well-organized private groups-perhaps even more susceptible,
on balance, than executive agencies.
Many of the most egregious illustrations of agency vulnerabil-
ity to pressure groups can be found in precisely this area. Thus the
Interstate Commerce Commission has created and enforced cartels
in the transportation industry; the Federal Trade Commission has
sometimes behaved in an anticompetitive manner, capitulating to
losers in the marketplace; and the FCC has been dominated by the
communications industry.8 Far from acting as disinterested ex-
perts, independent administrators often are, in practice, subject to
parochial interests.89
Why would agencies independent of the President be suscepti-
ble to factional power? The phenomenon might be explained at
least in part by the fact that executive agencies, precisely because
they are subject to presidential control, are able to withstand the
parochial pressures imposed on "independent" agencies that lack
the buffer of presidential oversight. The absence of this presiden-
tial buffer leaves agencies vulnerable both to individual members
and committees of Congress," which sometimes represent narrow
factions and well-organized private groups with significant stakes
in the outcome of regulatory decisions. Executive agencies are at
least sometimes immunized from those pressures precisely because
of the protective, insulating wing of the President.9 1 Ironically, in-
dependence from the President often appears to be a mechanism
for increasing susceptibility to factionalism.
The susceptibility of the independent agencies to factionalism
does not of course imply that executive officers are invulnerable to
similar forces. The notion that independent agencies are systemi-
cally more susceptible to factions than their counterparts within
8 See Marvin H. Bernstein, Regulating Business By Independent Commission 170
(Princeton, 1955); and Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory
Change (Oxford, 1989).
88 See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment (U Cal,
1987).
8 The Federal Reserve Board is an independent agency, but it may be an unusual case.
No well-organized group is its special target; the class of people benefited and burdened by
its decisions is too large and diffuse to make it susceptible to any particular group. This
independent agency may in fact be independent.
"0 See the remarks in Independent Agencies-Independent from Whom?, 41 Admin L
Rev 491 (1989) (panel discussion). Compare INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 946-59 (1983) (in-
validating the legislative veto on the ground that it bypasses bicameralism and presentment
requirements, which promote deliberation and prevent factionalism in government).
" See generally Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke
L J 215.
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the executive branch seems overly broad.92 But if Congress wants
to ensure independence in the execution of the laws, the indepen-
dent agency device appears to be a most unlikely way to achieve
that goal. The creation of independent agencies is usually self-
defeating."
G. Other Paradoxes, in Brief
I have described some prominent regulatory paradoxes, but
there are others as well. For example, it has been argued that the
pursuit of the "best interests of the child" in custody determina-
tions in fact disserves the best interests of children, because of the
enormous time spent in resolving the complicated factual ques-
tion.94 Protectionist legislation is sometimes justified on the theory
that it will help domestic industries develop into potent competi-
tive forces, but in fact protectionism may induce flabbiness and in
the end defeat the goal of promoting international competitiveness.
And restrictions on the availability of abortion, defended as a
means of protecting human life, appear to have resulted in the
death of many women per year and at the same time not to have
protected a large percentage of fetuses from the practice of
abortion. 5
Many more paradoxes can be found. There is evidence that
mandatory prescriptions for drugs have increased health risks by
limiting the availability and raising the cost of prescription drugs;
this in turn has decreased self-treatment and encouraged people to
use possibly less effective over-the-counter drugs.9 6 Product safety
11 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 662-66 (1984).
11 It is possible that independence is not the true goal of those who create independent
agencies, but instead that the actual purpose is susceptibility to Congress or private groups.
See Miller, 1986 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 85); see also text at note 86.
11 See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality
143-48 (Cambridge, 1989).
95 Hyman Rodman et al, The Abortion Question (Columbia, 1987); Daniel Farber, The
Facts on Abortion, 3 Constitutional Commentary 285 (1988).
" See Peltzman, 30 J L & Econ at 210-12 (cited in note 55). A similar study of automo-
.bile safety regulation found that such regulation had no effect or a perverse effect on safety
because it increased risks to pedestrians; see Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile
Safety Regulation, 83 J Pol Econ 677 (1975). The study is based on highly questionable
assumptions, see Mark Kelman, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: On Democ-
racy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 Va L Rev 199, 239-45 (1988), and it has been disproved by experience.
Indeed, automobile safety regulation is an example of regulatory success. See Crandall, Reg-
ulating the Automobile (cited in note 14); Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The
Struggle for Auto Safety (Harvard, forthcoming 1990).
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regulation may have a "lulling effect" on consumers, leading them
to take fewer precautions and to miscalculate risks.97 The govern-
ment prohibition on cigarette advertising on television, designed to
decrease smoking, may have increased smoking because it: (1) re-
duced competition among firms, thus cartelizing the industry over
the advertising issue; (2) eliminated the application of the fairness
doctrine to cigarettes, which would have ensured a vigorous anti-
cigarette campaign; and (3) saved the industry substantial sums of
money."8
A final paradox can be found in the law of sex discrimination,
where principles of "formal equality" have been invoked to forbid
consideration of sex in custody, alimony, and divorce disputes. It is
quite possible that equality principles, understood as prohibitions
on any form of sex differentiation in law, have in some contexts
produced less rather than more in the way of real equality between
men and women. 9 When two groups are differently situated, a le-
gal requirement that they be treated the same seems a perverse
method of promoting equality between them. There is in fact evi-
dence that the application of these principles has further disadvan-
taged women.1"' Here too, then, legal controls have been self-
defeating.
III. Two QUESTIONS: WHAT WE DON'T KNOW
A. Causation
One might react to the regulatory paradoxes by suggesting
that the relevant strategies are not self-defeating at all. On the
contrary, they might represent a conscious governmental choice
and even, on one view, regulatory success. Public choice theory
suggests that legislative outcomes are frequently a product of pres-
sure applied by well-organized private groups. It is not difficult to
find "cartels in the closet"'101 to account for many or all of the
paradoxes and to make them seem far less mysterious.
97 Viscusi, 28 J L & Econ at 539, 544, 546 (cited in note 54).
18 See Gideon Doron, How Smoking Increased When TV Advertising of Cigarettes
Was Banned, 3 Regulation 49 (March/April 1979).
11 See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 323, 357-58 (MacMillan, 1985); and
Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 S Ct Rev 201, 214-24.
100 See sources cited in note 99.
"0' Kelman, 74 Va L Rev at 236-37 (cited in note 96). See, for example, Howard P.
Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience, 20 J L &
Econ 379, 380 (1977).
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For example, the apparently perverse effects of redistributive
regulation may be actively sought by the benefited groups. On this
account, the purpose of minimum wage legislation might not be to
help the poor, but rather to immunize union members from com-
petition by people who are willing to work for low wages by limit-
ing entry into the labor market. Far from being unintended conse-
quences, the harmful effects on those at the bottom of the
economic ladder may be actively sought. Looked at from this per-
spective, minimum wage legislation creates a cartel among those
not threatened by unemployment, benefiting them at the expense
of new entrants into the labor market.
So too, independent agencies might be created at the behest of
groups that know they will have particularly strong influence over
public officials not subject to presidential oversight; or Congress
might create an independent agency not to ensure technocracy or
neutrality, but to increase the power of its members and commit-
tees over agency decisions. 102 Similarly, existing industry, in a bid
to reduce competition, might acquiesce in or actively seek regula-
tions distinguishing between old and new risks. It is hardly un-
usual for companies to enlist regulatory law in the service of
cartelization.
The overregulation-underregulation phenomenon has a similar
explanation. By adopting a draconian standard, legislators can
claim to support the total elimination of workplace hazards or
dirty air; but legislators and regulated industries know that admin-
istrators will shrink from enforcing the law. A "deal" in the form of
a stringent, unenforceable standard benefits the politically power-
ful actors. Hence the political economy of overregulation is similar
to that of open-ended delegations of administrative authority: in
both cases, legislative incentives incline Congress toward broad
and appealing statutes that will not in practice harm politically
powerful groups. The public is the only real loser.
Explained in this manner, the paradoxes of the regulatory
state are not mysterious at all. On the contrary, they are perfectly
predictable responses to electoral self-interest and to disparities in
political influence.
While explanations of this sort have power in some settings,
the evidence on their behalf is often overstated. It is of course pos-
sible that the seemingly paradoxical effects of regulatory programs
actually account for their enactment. But this is only a possibility.
102 Compare Miller, 1986 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 85).
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To explain a phenomenon by reference to its consequences is bad
social science, even though it is pervasive in such widely diverse
disciplines as neoclassical economics, Marxism, and sociobiology.0 3
In the context of the regulatory state, whether public choice expla-
nations are good ones rather than merely plausible stories depends
not just on the consequences of regulation, but also on a careful
investigation into the actual forces that lead to regulation. In the
regulatory sphere, such investigations are infrequent.
The most one can say is that the regulatory paradoxes might
reflect the influence of well-organized private groups, and that in
some settings there is direct or indirect evidence to support that
conclusion. At least thus far, any more global conclusion is simply
not supported by the facts.
B. Magnitude
Whether the regulatory paradoxes should cause major concern
depends on their magnitude. Here too, much of the relevant infor-
mation remains to be developed. For example, a decision to focus
on new sources of pollution would be understandable if that deci-
sion would have only a minor effect in perpetuating old sources.
But if the effect is substantial, the regulatory policy would almost
certainly be ill-considered. Similarly, the minimum wage might
well be justified if its effect is the unemployment of only a few
additional people. The relevant question is the elasticity of the de-
mand for labor.104 Finally, even if some people are misled by com-
pulsory disclosure of risks, perhaps there will be sufficient gains
through reducing others' ignorance to justify the regulation. And
even if some producers refuse to advertise at all in the face of a
substantiation requirement, perhaps the overall level of informa-
tion will increase.
Critics of regulation sometimes treat the existence of unin-
tended side effects or partly self-defeating strategies as a reason to
abandon regulatory controls altogether. 0 5 But in order to justify
that conclusion, it is necessary to gather detailed evidence on the
magnitude of the relevant effects in particular regulated markets
"I The best discussions here are by Jon Elster. See his various criticisms of functional
explanations in Explaining Technical Change: Studies in Rationality and Social Change
(Cambridge, 1983); The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge, 1989); and
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1989).
104 See text at note 74.
,o1 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main (Harvard, 1985).
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and overall. In some contexts, regulation having some self-defeat-
ing results will on the whole make things better rather than worse.
It is simply a fact that even a regulatory state pervaded by para-
doxes has had a number of substantial successes. 10 6
From both theory and experience, it is possible to conclude
that the regulatory paradoxes will arise frequently, and thus to
prescribe efforts to avoid them. Certainly we have far too little in-
formation to say, as a general matter, that regulatory programs
embodying the paradoxes are by virtue of that fact a bad idea on
balance, at least when compared with the pre-regulatory status
quo. Total elimination of such regulatory programs is hardly war-
ranted. Nevertheless, a system that avoided the paradoxes would
bring about major improvements.
IV. LESSONS
A. Congress
The paradoxes of regulation provide a number of concrete les-
sons for Congress. At the most general level, they suggest that leg-
islators should be attentive to the incentive effects of regulatory
statutes and the possibility of strategic or self-interested adapta-
tion by administrative agencies and members of regulated classes.
Statutes embodying an assumption that the preregulatory world
can be held constant-that existing prices, wages, choices, and so
forth will endure-are particularly likely to be confounded when
implemented.
More specifically, the paradoxes suggest that the legislature
should generally avoid best available technology strategies; be con-
cerned with old risks as well as new ones; not attempt to redistrib-
ute resources through regulation; be attentive to the possibility
that disclosure requirements will simply confuse people or chill in-
formation in the first instance; create incentives for regulation
when regulation is desired; as a rule place agencies under the con-
trol of the President; and call for some form of balancing between
the costs and benefits of regulation. Ideas of this sort have direct
implications for modern regulatory reform.10 7
For example, Congress is in the midst of considering amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act. One valuable strategy would be to sub-
"' See text at notes 10-23.
107 It is of course unclear that Congress will listen to such advice. Perhaps the legisla-
tors' existing incentives must be altered in order to bring about lasting reform of the sort
suggested here.
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stitute an emissions trading program for the "BAT" approach.108
Such a program would not require specified control technology for
all pollution sources, but would instead force people to pay for a
license to pollute and allow them to sell that "right" to other pro-
ducers. People who can reduce pollution will have a large incentive
to do so, because polluters will pay substantial sums for the pollu-
tion "credits" it frees them to sell. A fundamental virtue of an
emissions trading program is that it would create dynamic incen-
tives for pollution control by making it profitable for people to de-
velop good pollution control technology. Those who developed
such devices would be able both to reduce their own pollution and
to sell the technology to others. In either case, innovation would be
financially rewarding. There is considerable evidence that emis-
sions trading programs are successful. 09
The same rationale supports a trading system in the interna-
tional arena, in which some countries would pay others to reduce
emissions levels. International debt might be traded for protection
of nature. This would be especially desirable in the frequent in-
stances where the effects of pollution, or other environmental deg-
radation, crosses national boundaries. Such a system would pro-
duce more efficient reduction techniques and would also be more
equitable than an approach requiring all countries-rich and poor,
new and old contributors to environmental hazards-to use the
same control technology.
Congress is also in the process of selecting pollution control
requirements for new automobiles. Application of such controls to
old automobiles, unpleasant as it might be for present car owners,
would be an effective response to the old risk-new risk paradox.
Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration should be discour-
aged from unduly delaying the entry of new drugs onto the market.
Current practices slow the marketing of beneficial products by re-
quiring extremely elaborate testing. Easier screening strategies
combined with continuing, post-marketing safety examinations
would increase aggregate safety.
108 See Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan L Rev 1333 (cited in note 7); and Bruce Acker-
man and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 Colum J Envir L 171 (1988). Notably, the Senate version of the new
Clean Air Act, which passed on April 3, 1990, contains an emissions trading program to deal
with acid rain. See S 1630, 136 Cong Rec 52077-52086 (March 5, 1990).
109 Tietenberg, Emissions Trading at 38-58 (cited in note 24); Richard A. Liroff, Re-
forming Air Pollution Regulation: The Toil and Trouble of EPA's Bubble (Conservation
Foundation, 1986).
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Congress should also amend the Delaney Clause to allow de
minimis exceptions. Similarly, Congress should permit administra-
tors to balance costs and benefits in choosing the appropriate con-
trols for toxic substances, or Congress should itself make the regu-
latory decisions on the basis of some such balancing process. At the
same time, Congress should take steps to ensure that regulatory
statutes create strong incentives for industry to seek and adminis-
trators to promulgate regulations. 110 The current system puts a
premium on-and has resulted in-inaction. A system that (for ex-
ample) imposes disclosure requirements or other penalties on man-
ufacturers until regulations have established levels of relative
safety would be far more productive.
B. Judges and Administrators
The regulatory paradoxes provide important lessons for judges
and administrators as well as legislators. These officials are of
course bound by legislative enactments, and to the extent that reg-
ulatory statutes unambiguously call for self-defeating strategies,
officials have no choice but to honor them. But frequently the in-
terpretation of a statute, or the filling of statutory gaps, is based
on an understanding of the real world consequences of the alterna-
tive possibilities. Administrators exercise considerable discretion in
giving content to ambiguous laws,111 and the legal judgment about
whether an agency's decision is "arbitrary" within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure Act" 2 should be informed by an ac-
curate understanding of the paradoxes of the regulatory state. At-
tention to the often unanticipated systemic effects of regulatory
controls is an imperative for administrators and judges as well as
for legislators. I offer three examples here of how these officials can
use the knowledge of regulatory paradoxes to inform their actions.
1. The overregulation-underregulation paradox.11
In two important cases, the Supreme Court was asked to inter-
pret the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act that
regulate exposure to toxic substances. The pertinent language di-
rects the Secretary of Labor to promulgate the standard that
o See note 45.
"' See Chevron USA, Inc. v NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984), which gives enormous poli-
cymaking discretion to agencies engaged in statutory construction.
112 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1982).
"' In this section I adapt the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 489-93 (1989).
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"most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the haz-
ard . . . for the period of his working life."" 4 The statute also
defines "occupational safety and health standard[s]" as measures
that require "conditions... reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment."" 5
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Pe-
troleum Institute,"6 the Court was confronted with an OSHA reg-
ulation of benzene. Though the consequences of the regulation
were sharply contested, there was reason to believe that the regula-
tion would impose enormous costs for small or speculative gains. A
plurality of the Court concluded that the Secretary of Labor must
establish that a toxic substance posed a "significant risk" to health
before she could regulate it. There was little direct support for the
plurality's conclusion in the language or history of the Act. Unable
to point to a solid textual basis for its "significant risk" require-
ment, the plurality invoked a clear statement principle:
In the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unrea-
sonable to assume that Congress intended to give the Secre-
tary the unprecedented power over American industry that
would result from the Government's view .... Expert testi-
mony that a substance is probably a human carcinogen . . .
would justify the conclusion that the substance poses some
risk of serious harm no matter how minute the exposure and
no matter how many experts testified that they regarded the
risk as insignificant. That conclusion would in turn justify
pervasive regulation limited only by the constraint of feasibil-
ity .... [T]he Government's theory would give OSHA power
to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any,
discernable benefit." 7
The plurality went on to suggest that the government's inter-
pretation would give the Secretary of Labor "open-ended" poli-
cymaking authority that might amount to an unconstitutional del-
egation of legislative power. In a concurring opinion advocating an
interpretation of the Act that would permit cost-benefit balancing,
114 29 USC § 655(b)(5).
29 USC § 652(8).
,, 448 US 607 (1980).
117 Id at 645.
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Justice Powell suggested that "a standard-setting process that ig-
nored economic considerations would result in a serious misalloca-
tion of resources and a lower effective level of safety than could be
achieved under standards set with reference to the comparative
benefits available at a lower cost."" 8
The "significant risk" requirement cannot be found explicitly
in the statute; indeed, the text of the relevant provisions suggests
that no such requirement was imposed on the Secretary of Labor.
But the plurality's conclusion was nonetheless sound. Realistically
speaking, the language of the statute need not be considered dis-
positive. It is simply a myth to suggest that the Congress that en-
acted OSHA even considered the propriety of regulation requiring
enormous expenditures to redress minimal risks. Despite the broad
language of the toxic substances provision, Congress never focused
on that problem.
In the context of American Petroleum, the plurality was
therefore correct in considering itself free to read an implicit "sig-
nificant risk" requirement into the statute. In light of the over-
regulation-underregulation paradox, it would make little sense to
interpret the statute so as to allow-indeed, require-the Secre-
tary to regulate to the point of "feasibility" merely because one or
a few employees might suffer "material health impairment" as a
result of a lifetime of exposure. Such an interpretation would make
the Department of Labor reluctant to embark on a course of regu-
lation at all, and as we have seen, would result in less, not more,
protection of workers. It would ensure that there would be less reg-
ulation of carcinogens or less enforcement of those regulations that
were promulgated-or, most likely, both.
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan,"
the Supreme Court decided a question left open in American Pe-
troleum: whether the Occupational Health and Safety Act required
cost-benefit analysis. In arguing that it did, the industry contended
that the word "feasible" meant that the Secretary must show not
only a significant risk, but also that the benefits of regulation justi-
fied the costs. "Feasibility," in the industry's view, contemplated a
balancing of costs and benefits. The government contended that
once OSHA had shown a significant risk, it could regulate to the
point where the survival of the regulated industry would be endan-
gered by additional controls. For the government, the term "feasi-
118 Id at 670 (Powell concurring).
119 452 US 490 (1981).
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bility" connoted not cost-benefit balancing, but instead regulation
to the maximum extent "possible."
In accepting the government's argument, the Court relied on
the dictionary definition of "feasible," concluding that the term
meant "capable of being done, executed, or effected," rather than
justified after balancing costs and benefits. 120 This approach to
statutory interpretation was not entirely unreasonable. But the
same principles that support the plurality view in American Petro-
leum cast doubt on American Textile Manufacturers.
First, notwithstanding the statute's language, it is probably
unrealistic to believe that Congress actually focused on, and re-
solved, the question whether the government's approach was to be
favored over some kind of balancing of costs and benefits. That
question never arose during the debates.12" ' Second, a system re-
quiring the Secretary to identify a significant risk, but prohibiting
her from undertaking cost-benefit analysis, seems utterly irra-
tional. Whether a risk is "significant" depends in large part on the
costs of eliminating it. A risk that is relatively small might call for
regulation if the costs are also small, while a large risk might well
be best left unregulated if the costs of regulation are enormous. A
rational system of regulation looks not at the magnitude of the risk
alone, but assesses the risk in comparison to the costs. Finally, a
law requiring the Secretary to regulate all significant risks to the
point of endangering the industry would be a recipe for both over-
regulation and underregulation.
These considerations could not have controlled the Court's de-
cision if the statute dictated a contrary result, but the word "feasi-
ble" was probably capacious enough to accommodate a kind of
proportionality requirement. To be sure, the case was a difficult
one. But by its reading of the statute, the Supreme Court has con-
tributed to the irrationality of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act-irrationality that has harmed workers, employers, consumers,
and the public at large. An understanding of the overregulation-
underregulation paradox might well have prevented this result.
2. The old risk-new risk paradox.
A number of judicial decisions might have been different if
courts had been attuned to the old risk-new risk paradox. Con-
,,0 Id at 508-09.
2, See the detailed account in Justice Marshall's opinion in American Petroleum, 448
US at 707-19.
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sider, for example, one district court's creation, in the face of an
ambiguous text, of the "prevention of significant deterioration"
(PSD) program in Sierra Club v Ruckelshaus.122 In that case, the
court ruled that state implementation plans under the Clean Air
Act must include provisions not merely complying with national
air quality standards, but also designed to prevent the degradation
of air currently cleaner than those standards require. The conse-
quence of the PSD program is to ensure that especially clean areas
remain especially clean. They are not permitted to become dirtier
even if they would continue to provide a safe and healthful
environment.
One of the court's goals was to ensure that federal environ-
mental policy protected beauty and visibility in currently pristine
areas.' 23 While the PSD program has to some degree promoted
that goal, it has also had perverse side effects. For example, it has
delayed the salutary substitution of clean, low-sulphur Western
coal for dirty, high-sulfur Eastern coal; at the same time, it has
protected dirty existing plants in the East against replacement
with cleaner new ones in the West. 2 4 To protect the atmosphere in
Aspen from degradation is, almost inevitably, to perpetuate the ex-
istence of old, particularly dirty producers in New York. The fore-
closure of new risks has thus increased the magnitude of old ones.
It is far from clear that the environment is better off as a whole.
Indeed, it should come as no surprise that the PSD program
has become a primary means of protecting eastern industry and
eastern states against western interests. States in the West seeking
to attract industry have found, perversely, that an environmental
program can be used to create a cartel against new entry.2 5 A PSD
program based on an understanding of the adverse effects of that
cartel for the prevention of environmental degradation would take
a quite different form.
The court that decided the Sierra Club case was unaware of
these effects. Because the statutory basis for the decision was quite
thin, an understanding of the environmental and nonenviron-
mental costs associated with the PSD program might well have led
to a contrary result.
122 344 F Supp 253 (D DC 1972).
123 See the discussion in R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the
Clean Air Act (Brookings, 1983).
124 Id at 80-83.
121 See Ackerman and Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air at 44-48 (cited in note 50); and B.
Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Served?, in
Stigler, ed, Chicago Studies in Political Economy at 498 (cited in note 4).
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3. The independent agency problem.
The precise constitutional status of the independent agency
remains an uncertain question.'26 In Humphrey's Executor v
United States,27 the Supreme Court, affirming the constitutional
validity of the independent agency, held that Congress could con-
stitutionally prevent the President from removing a member of the
Federal Trade Commission simply because it pleased him to do so.
Recent decisions have reaffirmed the authority of Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor insofar as it recognizes that some degree of independence
from the President is permissible.'28 But suppose that members of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Federal Trade Com-
mission act in ways that consistently reject the President's views
about public policy. May the President discharge the relevant com-
missioners? It is frequently assumed that he may not. But neither
Humphrey's Executor nor any other case explains what "indepen-
dence" precisely means, or whether it extends to such situations.
The problem might be solved through statutory interpretation
that takes account of the independent agency paradox. The rele-
vant provisions allow the President to discharge a commissioner
"for cause," defined as "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office.' 29 Although ambiguous, these words do not en-
tirely immunize commissioners from the control of the President;
instead they allow him to remove the officials under certain cir-
cumstances. For those attuned to the independent agency paradox,
it might seem that the words are best read to grant the President
something in the way of supervisory and removal power-allowing
him, for example, to discharge as inefficient or neglectful of duty
those commissioners who have frequently or on important occa-
sions acted in ways inconsistent with his wishes.
This result might seem counterintuitive in light of the fre-
quent understanding that independent agencies are to be immu-
nized from presidential policymaking. 130 But there is a plausible
precedent for precisely this conclusion in a recent Supreme Court
" See Miller, 1986 S Ct Rev at 96-97 (cited in note 83); Strauss, 84 Colum L Rev at
596-605 (cited in note 92).
.27 295 US 602 (1935).
128 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988); Mistretta v United States, 109 S Ct 647
(1989).
129 See, for example, Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC § 41 (1982).
1M This understanding is perhaps embraced, though obliquely and in dicta, in
Humphrey's Executor, which describes the commissioners of the FTC as "independent of
Executive authority, except in [their] selection" by the President. 295 US at 625-26.
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decision, Bowsher v Synar.11 In that case, the Court held that
Congress could not delegate power to administer the Gramm-Rud-
man statute to the Comptroller General, because the Comptroller
was subject to congressional will. In the Court's view, those who
execute the law must not be subject to the policymaking authority
of the Congress except insofar as legislative instructions are em-
bodied in substantive law.132 The relevant statute allowed Congress
to discharge the Comptroller for "inefficiency, . . . neglect of duty,
. . . [or] malfeasance."'13 The Court said that these words con-
ferred on Congress "very broad" removal power and would author-
ize Congress to remove the Comptroller for "any number of actual
or perceived transgressions of the legislative will."' 34
The words governing congressional power over the Comptrol-
ler General and presidential power over independent agencies are
essentially identical. If those words have the same meaning in
these admittedly different contexts, the President has "very
broad" removal power over the commissioners of the independent
agencies, with correlative powers of supervision and guidance. It
would follow that the independent agencies are in fact subject to a
considerable degree of presidential control. They are not, as a mat-
ter of statutory law, "independent" of him at all.
It would of course be plausible to suggest that the different
contexts require the same words to have different meanings. Per-
haps a statute restricting congressional power over the Comptroller
General should be understood to impose thinner limitations than
does a statute controlling presidential power over independent
commissioners; such a reading would hardly be an implausible re-
construction of legislative goals in light of the context and back-
ground of the relevant statutes. In view of the independent agency
paradox, however, courts would do well to invoke a clear statement
principle that grants the President broad supervisory power over
independent agencies, unless Congress has expressly stated its will
to the contrary. Such an approach would minimize the risks inher-
ent in the independent agency form, and promote coordination and
accountability in government. It would require Congress to speak
unambiguously if it wants to compromise those goals.'35
131 478 US 714 (1986).
132 Id at 726-27.
133 Id at 728; 31 USC § 703(e)(2) (1982).
13' 478 US at 729.
" See Peter L. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin L Rev 181 (1986).
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V. CONCLUSION
There are multiple breakdowns in private markets, and gov-
ernment controls often successfully counteract them. The adminis-
trative state has not been a universal failure. But regulatory pro-
grams have not always succeeded, and the paradoxes of the
regulatory state have been a pervasive source of its problems. Self-
defeating regulatory strategies take many forms. I have discussed
six such paradoxes and referred to several others; still others un-
doubtedly exist.
In proposing reforms for the regulatory state, little can be
gained from generalities that point to the frequent problems cre-
ated by either government regulation or private markets. These
problems are too particular and too dependent on the context to
allow for global prescriptions.5 6 It is far more helpful to rely on
particularized understandings of how both markets and regulation
tend to break down-to learn, in short, from the past. The experi-
ence of the regulatory state includes many self-defeating regula-
tory strategies. Enough information is in place to help legislators,
administrators, and judges to minimize their adverse effects, and
perhaps to prevent their occurrence. The result would be a small
but firm step in the direction of an American-style perestroika-a
system that is entirely unembarrassed by the use of government to
reflect democratic aspirations, to promote economic welfare, and to
foster distributional equity, while at the same time insisting on
strategies that embody the flexibility, adaptability, productive po-
tential, and decentralization characteristic of private markets.
"' At least this is so for systems that, on the one hand, respect private property and
freedom of contract while, on the other hand, imposing regulatory controls on the most
harmful consequences of unregulated markets. General prescriptions would of course have
considerable weight in collectivist systems or systems of "laissez faire."
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